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The opinions of the majority of the judges, and the judgment of
the House of Lords, in .Elnens vs. Elderton, (4 1I. L. C. 624)y,
confirming the judgment of the Court of E xchequer Chamber in
Elderton vs. Enzmens, (6 C. B. 160), notwithstanding the cases of
Aspdin vs. Austin, (5 Q. B. 671) and Dunn vs. Sayles, (Id. 685),
may be considered as having finally settled, that an agreement
between A and B, that A will serve B for a term, and in consideration thereof B will pay a salary for such service, will, in the
absence of any stipulation clearly indicating a contrary intention,
raise an implied contract on the part of B that he will allow A
to continue in the service until the end of the term, in order that
the stipulated reward may be earned, and not a mere agreement to
pay the salary at the end of the term. B is not bound to find
actual work or employment for A, but he is bound to allow the
relation of master and servant, or employer and employed, to continue during the term, subject, of course, to his right to dismiss A
for misconduct. And the distinction between an agreement to
employ or to engage the services of a person in the sense before
mentioned, for a given term, and then to pay for such services at
the end of the term, and an agreement simply to pay a given sum
for services at the end of a certain term, is most important in its
consequences. In the former case, the person employed has an
immediate remedy, the moment he is dismissed without lawful
cause, for a breach of the contract to employ, and will recover
compensation in damages for such breach, which may be less than
the stipulated wages payable at the end of the term, if it happens
that he has the opportunity of employing his time beneficially in
another way, and the employer is not then bound to pay the whole
sum agreed upon. But if the agreement be that the person employed is to be paid a certain sum for his services at a certain
time, provided he serves or is ready to serve, there being. no contract to employ during the term, he can only maintain an action,
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after that time has arrived, for non-payment, and then is entitled
to recover the full amount, though his loss may be much less. And
convenience is decidedly in favor of construing such agreements to
be contracts to employ, as well as for the payment of wages. The
question in the construction of these, as in all other contracts, is,
what was the intention of the contracting parties; but the decision
in BEmmens vs. Elderton, shows that the strong leaning of the
judges is, on grounds of policy and convenience, to hold all contracts for service on the one part, and for the payment of wages
on the other, for a specified time, to be contracts on the part of
the employer to maintain thd relation of employer and employed
during the term, (though he is not bound to supply work), and not
merely to pay the wages, unless there be some stipulation in the
contract, or circumstance connected therewith, clearly and distinctly
showing a contrary intention on the part of the contracting parties.
Elderton vs. -Emmens was an action by an attorney against a
company on an agreement between them, which, stripped of the
difficulties which arose from the form of the pleadings, was, in substance, "that from a certain day the plaintiff, as attorney of the
company, should receive a salary of 1001. a year, in lieu of rendering an annual bill for general business transacted by him for the
company, and should, for such salary, advise and act for the company on all occasions and in all matters connected with the company, (the prosecuting, &c. of suits, and some other matters, for
which he was to be paid the regular charges, excepted); and that,
in consideration that the plaintiff would advise and act for the
company in the manner and on the terms aforesaid, the company
promised to pay him the salary of 1001. a year ;" and the plaintiff
alleged, as a breach of this agreement, that before the expiration
of one year the company wrongfully dismissed him from their employment, and refused to employ him as such attorney of the company, and to pay him the said salary. The Court of Exchequer
Chamber, and afterwards the House of Lords, held, that the "refusal to employ," as here alleged, in the breach, must be taken to
mean, not a refusal to find actual work for the plaintiff, but, after
verdict at least, in the sense which would support the declaration,
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viz. a refusal to allow the plaintiff to continue in their service as
their attorney-a refusal to continue the relation of employer and
employed; and that the agreement showed a contract by the company, not merely to pay the plaintiff his salary at the end of the
year, but to continue him in their service as their attorney for one
year at least, though they were not bound to find work for him;
and that therefore he was entitled to sue the company immediately
on his dismissal, for the damages he thereby sustained, and was
not bound to wait until the end of the year, and then sue for his
year's salary ;-and the majority of the judges commented strongly
on the great inconvenience that would arise from a contrary construction of the contract; for if the only remedy was by action for
the salary, the party employed could enter into no inconsistent
employment, but must remain idle during the term; for if he acted
otherwise he could recover nothing, because he would not have continued ready to serve until the salary became due. Indeed, it is
still an open question whether a person who has engaged to serve
for a certain time, at certain wages, and who is wrongfully turned
away by his master before that time has expired, is at liberty to
elect to treat the dismissal as no dismissal at all, and to demand at
the expiration of the term for which he was hired, the whole of his
stipulated wages, on the ground that his readiness to serve is equivalent in law to actual service. Mr. Smith, in his notes to Cutter vs.
-Powell,(2 Smith's L. 0. 19, 20), states the result of the authorities
to be, that a clerk, agent, or servant has his election of three remedies :-First, he may bring a special action for his master's breach
of contract in dismissing him, and this remedy he may pursue immediately. (Paganivs. aandolphi, 2 Car. & P. 370). Secondly, he
may treat the contract as rescinded, and may immediately sue on a
quantum meruit for the work actually performed; (P-lanchg vs.
Colburn, 8 Bing. 14); but in that case, as he sues on an implied
contract, arising out of actual services, he can only recover for the
time he has actually served. (And see lFewings vs. Tisdal, 1
Exch. 295; 11 Jur. 977, accordante). Thirdly, he may wait until
the termination of the period for which he was hired, and may
then, perhaps, sue for his whole wages in indebitatus assumpsit,
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relying on the doctrine of constructive service. (Gandell vs. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375 ; Collins vs. Price, 5 Bing. 132; vide tamen
the observations of the judges in Smitth vs. .Hayward, 7 Ad. & El.
544). As observed by Crompton, J., (4 H. L. 0. 646), "It is
clear, since the case of Fewings vs. qisdal, that this last remedy
cannot be maintained in the shape of indebitatus assumpsit, for the
simple reason that the allegation of the defendant being indebted
for work done is untrue. But the question is still left undecided,
how far a special action of debt, averring a contract to pay, a continuing readiness to serve, and a dismissal from service on the part
of the master, might not be maintained." And in p. 644 the
learned judge, commenting on the inconveniences of allowing such
an action, says, "It would be much to be lamented if a servant or
agent who was dismissed should be able to say, 'I could easily get
another situation as good, or better, but I will not do so, and instead of claiming the real damage I have sustained by the inconvenience and temporary loss of situation, I will bring an action
for every instalment of salary, till the contemplated period has
And Parke, B., in the judgment in the Exchequer
elapsed."
Chamber, (6 C. B. 187), said, "If it be held that such a contract
as this is for service and pay respectively, and that although the
employer has determined the relation by an illegal dismissal, the
employed may entitle himself to the wages for the whole time, by
being ready to serve, a doctrine would be sanctioned that would be
of pernicious consequence, as in the case of a business being discontinued, or a dismissal for misconduct without legal proof."'(And see the observations of Erle, J., in Beckham vs. Drake, 2
H. L. C. 606).
There are two cases (Aspdin vs. Austin, 5 Q. B. 671, and Dunn
vs. Sayles, Id. 685) cited in rnmmens vs. Elderton which were
questioned', but not distinctly overruled. It is, however, difficult
to reconcile them with the principle of that decision. Parke, B.,
indeed, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Error, (6 C. B.
187), and in his opinion before the House of Lords, (4 H. L. C.
I See
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669, 670), held that Aspdin vs. Austin and _Dunn vs. Sayles, were
clearly distinguishable from the case then before the Court: the
former on the ground, that if the Court had there held that the
defendant had contracted to continue to employ the plaintiff for
the term of three years, the defendant would have been obliged, at
however great a loss, to continue his business for that time; and
the latter upon a similar ground, and also that in the indenture
sued upon in that case the words, "it is agreed," which would
make the stipulation the agreement of both parties, were wanting.
It is at least questionable whether the distinctions taken by the
learned baron are satisfactory. In Aspdin vs. Austin, by an
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff
agreed to manufacture for the defendant cement of a certain quality;
and the defendant, on condition of the plaintiff performing such
engagement, promised to pay him 41. weekly, during the first two
years following the date of the agreement, and 51. weekly during
the third year, and also to take him into partnership as a manufacturer of cement at the end of the term; and the breach assigned
was, that the defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to continue
in the service of the defendant during the three years. The Court
held that the agreement did not raise an implied promise that the
defendant would continue the plaintff in his service during the three
years, or any part th-reof; though the defendant was bound by
the express words to pay the plaintiff the stipulated wages during
that period, if the plaintiff served, or was ready to serve, according
to his contract. And Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment of
the Court, said, "The breach here assigned by the plaintiff assumes
that the defendant, at hoii ever great loss to himself, was bound to
continue his business for three years; but the defendant has not
covenanted to do so; he has covenanted only to pay weekly sums
for three years to the plaintiff, on condition of his performing what
on his part he has made a condition precedent; and the plaintiff
will be entitled to recover those sums, whether he performs that or
not, so long as he is ready, and willing, and offers to perform it,
and is prevented only by the defendant from doing it. This, then,
is the safe rule for determining the rights of these parties between
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each other, and no injustice follows to the plaintiff. If he should
assign a breach in the non-payment of the weekly sums, it would
be no answer for the defendant to say that he had discontinued the
business and dismissed the plaintiff; the reply would be, that he
might indeed, if he pleased, do both, but that he was still bound to
make the payment which he had expressly covenanted to make."
It is submitted, that it is scarcely correct to say that the breach in
this case assumed that by the agreement the defendant bound or
obliged himself to carry on his business for three years; for if the
defendant at any time abandoned his business, he would not be
liable to be sued by the plaintiff in terms for such abandonment;
the only effect of such a course would be to render him liable to an
action by the plaintiff for refusing to continue him in the service,
and the measure of damages which the plaintiff would recover would
be the loss which he sustained by his dismissal. It is true, that if
the defendant ceased to carry on the business, he could not perform
his contract to employ the plaintiff in that business; but, as observed
by Lord Denman, (5 Q. B. 683), "it would be an extension of the
principle of Sampson vs. Easterby, (6 Bing. 644), Saltoun vs.
Houston, (1 Bing. 433), and other cases cited in the argument, to
hold, that where parties have expressly'covenanted to perform certain acts, they must be held to have impliedly covenanted for every
act convenient or even necessary for the perfect performance of
their express covenants." And the covenant by the defendant to
,carry on the business would seem to be in its nature more extensive than a mere covenant to employ the plaintiff in the business,
though as between the plaintiff and the defendant the damages
arising from a breach of either covenant would be the same. But
even assuming that if the Court had construed the agreement as
amounting to a covenant to employ, such a construction must necessarily have raised an implied contract to continue the business, it
is difficult to see how that could afford any ground for presuming
an intention on the part of the defendant to covenant only for the
payment of wages, and not to employ; for if the defendant must
be taken to have known that the effect of covenanting to employ
in the particular business for three years would be to raise an
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implied contract to carry on the business, he must be presumed to
be also cognizant of the consequences of a breach of his covenants.
Now, as between the contracting parties in an agreement for the
plaintiff to serve and the defendant to employ and pay wages,
whether the plaintiff sued for a breach of the contract to employ,
or on the implied covenant to carry on the business, the damage
sustained by the plaintiff would be precisely the same, the only loss
sustained by the plaintiff by the abandonment of the business being
the loss of his employment. As, therefore, in such an agreement,
the injury to the defendant, in case of a breach of the supposed
implied covenant to carry on the business, would not exceed the
injury which he would sustain from the breach of the covenant-to
employ, there does not appear to be any sufficient reason for saying that the circumstance that an implied covenant to carry on the
business arises, negatives an inte'ntion to enter into a contract to
continue the plaintiff in the defendant's service, any more than the
implication of a contract simply to.employ would do. For a breach
of either of these covenants, all that the plaintiff could obtain would
be damages for his dismissal; and whether that dismissal was caused
by the defendant giving up his business, or by any other cause, thedamages would be the same; and these damages, in the great
majority of cases at least, -must be less than the salary, which,
according to the doctrine laid down in Aspdim vs. Austin, the
plaintiff might sue for from time to time until the end of the term.
The inconvenience and hardship to the master is increased instead
of diminished by compelling him, in the event of his giving up his
business, to pay his workmen the full amount of salary for the
period of their engagements, instead of the smaller amount, which
in most cases would compensate them for the loss sustained by their
dismissal. The inconvenience to the public, and to the servant
himself, arising out of such a doctrine has been already pointed out
in the passages cited from the judgment of the Exchequer Chainber in Blderton vs. .Emmens, and the observations of Erle and
Crompton, JJ., in the House of Lords. Dunn vs. Say/les was decided upon precisely the same ground as Aspdin vs. Austin, and
for the same reasons as those above urged it is submitted that it
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must be considered as substantially overruled by and not distinguishable from, .Emmens vs. .Elderton. With respect to the other
ground on which this case was distinguished by Parke, B., viz: the
omission of the words "it is agreed," it must be remarked, that in
-.Emmens vs. Elderton those words were no doubt most important,
for the agreement was simply that the plaintiff hofld receive and
accept a salary of 1001. a year; and without the words, "it is
agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that" &c., there
would have been no covenant by the defendant even to pay the salary, from which alone the covenant to continue the plaintiff in the
service, so as to enable him to earn the salary, could be implied;
but in Dunn vs. Sayles there was an express covenant by the defendant to pay the plaintiff wages, and it is from the covenant to
pay wages for services, that, according to _Emmens vs. Elderton,
the implied covenant by the employer to continue the employed in
the service arises. Parke, B., in his opinion in the House of Lords,
(4 H. L. C. 667), himself says, "I think that there is clearly implied, on the part of the person *ho contracts to pay a salary for
services for a term, a contract 'to permit ,those services to be performed, in order that the stipulated reward may be earned, besides
an agreement to pay the salary at the end of the term." In Sykes
vs. Dixon, 9 Ad. & El. 693, there being only an agreement by A
to serve C for twelve months, without any contract by B to employ A, the Court held the agreement void for want mutuality;
but in that case there was no contract by B to pay wages for the
service, from which a covenant to employ could be implied. The
recent case of Beg. vs. Welch, 22 L. J., M. C., 145, decides that
where, in , contract to serve for a. term, the wages to be paid to the
servant for such service are not a fixed sum, but are to be measured
by the amount of work done, the fact that the wages are so made
dependent on the work done raises an implied obligation on the
part of the employer to find a reasonable quantity of work for the
servant, for otherwise the employer would be under no obligation to
pay the servant any wages. And see Pilkington vs. Scott, 15 M.
& W. 657.

